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CREIGHTON C. HORTON II (#1542) 
Attorney at Law 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CREIGHTON C. HORTON II# 
Petitioner, 
-vs-
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
Respondent. 
No. 920273-CA 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT'S ASSERTION THAT LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY SUPPORTS ITS POSITION IS INCORRECT 
Respondent in its memorandum focuses only on selected portions 
of the relevant retirement statutes in an attempt to bolster its 
argument that Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-203 (1992) is unambiguous and 
mandates that petitioner be forced into the noncontributory 
retirement system because he transferred from the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office to the Attorney General's Office. Respondent's 
assertion that the other retirement statutes cited by petitioner 
are not relevant to whether petitioner is entitled to remain a 
member of the contributory retirement system is an effort to 
dissuade the court from examining the entire statutory scheme and 
to focus attention upon merely an isolated portion of it. 
Respondent's brief cites no supporting authority, whereas 
petitioner's brief cites authority for the proposition that in 
ascertaining legislative intent, courts should consider all 
statutory provisions, seek a construction which harmonizes all 
portions, and avoid a construction that rests on an assumption that 
the legislature intended to do unfair, unjust, or unreasonable 
things. 
Respondent in its memorandum incorrectly states that 
petitioner attempted to effectuate a legislative amendment. In 
fact, petitioner merely inquired of Senator Kay Cornaby, the 
sponsor of the original legislation establishing the 
noncontributory system, whether the legislature intended to force 
those in petitioner's situation into the new system, as had been 
represented to petitioner by the Board. In response to 
petitioner's inquiry and not upon his solicitation, Senator Cornaby 
sponsored legislation which would have clarified that employees in 
petitioner's position could elect to remain in the contributory 
system. Respondent and petitioner agreed to suspend petitioner's 
case until after the legislative session, in case the bill's 
passage resolved the issues in his case. 
Respondent incorrectly characterizes the failure of the bill's 
passage as evidence of legislative intent in its favor. It is not. 
As the Stipulation of Facts provides, and respondent acknowledges, 
the bill passed in the Senate but was not called up or even 
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considered by the House. Since the bill was not considered, it was 
never acted upon, nor was any vote taken. Respondent's brief 
inconsistently acknowledges that the bill was not considered in the 
House and then argues that such a failure somehow demonstrates 
legislative intent. The bill's failure to reach consideration in 
the House is no greater indication of legislative intent than is 
the fact that it passed without opposition in the Senate. 
PQINT 11 
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS THAT PETITIONER'S RIGHTS 
HAVE NOT VESTED OR, ALTERNATIVELY, THAT HE HAS 
RECEIVED A "SUBSTANTIAL SUBSTITUTE" FOR THE 
BENEFITS TAKEN FROM HIM BY THE BOARD'S ACTION, 
ARE WITHOUT MERIT 
Respondent's argument that^^petitioner's retirement benefits 
have not vested because he has not satisfied all conditions 
precedent to retirement begs the question. Certainly if petitioner 
is forced into the noncontributory system his benefits will not 
vest until retirement. The primary difference between the 
retirement systems is that, in the contributory system, amounts 
contributed by the employer vest immediately to the employee's 
benefit, while in the noncontributory, vesting does not occur until 
retirement. This is statutory and not a question of Board 
interpretation. Utah Code Ann. § 49-2-301 (1992). Implicit in 
respondent's argument is the notion that at any time up to the 
point of retirement it may change the rules of the game. This is 
inconsistent with Utah's approach that pension benefits are not 
mere gratuities, but are contractual in nature, and that no 
substitute may adversely affect the employee's vested rights. 
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The argument that the noncontributory system provides a 
substantial substitute for the loss of the 6% vested contribution 
made by the employer under the contributory system is disingenuous. 
The Legislature did not take the "substantial substitute" approach 
when it originally enacted the legislation establishing the 
noncontributory retirement system. If it had, it could have simply 
provided that all members of the contributory system would 
henceforth be forced into the noncontributory system. Instead, it 
took into account employees' vested rights, and specifically 
provided that any current member of the retirement system, whether 
a state employee or an employee of a political subdivision, had the 
absolute right to not be forced into the new noncontributory 
system, a system in which the employee's right to continually 
vesting contributions would be cut off. It is disingenuous to 
suggest that a 1.5% employer contribution to a 401(k) program (as 
opposed to 6% actively vesting under the contributory system) and 
a three-year rather than five-year final salary averaging for a 
benefit determination if one retires in the system, is a 
substantial substitute for the benefits one receives under the 
contributory system. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT'S ASSERTION THAT RESOLUTION #86-15 
IS CONSISTENT WITH ITS POSITION IS ERRONEOUS 
Respondent strains to differentiate petitioner's situation 
from those employees who left the employ of political subdivisions 
and "enter[ed] full-time employment with the state" after the 
effective date of the act, but who were treated as transferees by 
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Board Resolution #86-15. Respondent in its memo states that 
"...the only reason that Respondent allowed employees who changed 
employment during the election period to consider the change in 
employment as a 'transfer' was to preserve the election period of 
those employees, which was statutorily guaranteed for a period of 
six months after the effective date of the act..." (Respondent's 
brief, pp. 10-11). 
This analysis is inconsistent because, under respondent's 
interpretation, no employee entering employment with the state 
after the effective date had any statutorily guaranteed right to 
elect between systems. Indeed, respondent justifies its action in 
petitioner's case on the ground that unambiguous statutory language 
mandates that any employee who voluntarily elects to move from one 
unit of government to another loses all protection against being 
forced into the noncontributory system. The entire thrust of 
respondent's argument is that the statute is clear and unambiguous, 
and mandates such action. Yet respondent cannot get around the 
fact that it accomplished by resolution that which it now claims is 
strictly prohibited under the statute, namely, allowing one who 
transfers employment from a political subdivision to the state 
after the effective date of the legislation to be treated as a 
transferee rather than as a new employee. 
The statute itself is silent on rights of transferees, 
creating the ambiguity which gave rise to Board Resolution #86-15. 
This statutory ambiguity is one respondent now refuses to 
acknowledge, although it concedes that the Retirement Act must be 
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interpreted liberally in petitioner's favor. Respondent's 
unwillingness to concede the ambiguity which is evidenced by its 
own resolution is contradictory but not surprising, since its 
entire argument hinges on the premise that the statute clearly cuts 
off the rights of transferees, an argument which its own resolution 
belies. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing and the argument and authority 
contained in the brief of petitioner previously filed, the decision 
of the Board denying petitioner's request should be reversed and 
petitioner should be allowed to remain a member of the contributory 
retirement system under the provisions of Section 2 of Title 49, 
U.C.A., 1953 as amended, known as the "Public Employees' Retirement 
Act.n 
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